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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course
Dispositions in Lower Courts:

of

Proceedings,

and

This is a case where Johnson-Bowles, a securities brokerdealer, and Marlen Johnson, a securities agent
referred to as

(collectively

"the Johnsons"), were sanctioned by the Utah

Division of Securities (the "Division") for dishonest and unethical
practices in the securities business.

Following a formal hearing

and administrative review, the Division suspended the Johnsons'
licenses for one year and placed the Johnsons on an additional two
years probation.

The Johnsons appealed to the Utah Court of

Appeals, which upheld the Division's actions. Following a petition
for rehearing by the Johnsons, the Court of Appeals issued an
Amended Opinion on February 19, 1992, which differed in a few
respects from the original opinion, but which likewise upheld the
Division's actions.

The Johnsons' current petition for writ of

certiorari is from that February 19th Amended Opinion of the Court
of Appeals.
Statement of the Facts:
The Division basically agrees with the facts and procedural
history as stated in the Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals on
pages 1-6 and as found by Securities Advisory Board and the
Director of the Division in the Division's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order of August 10, 1990.
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Put simply, the Johnsons engaged in a "short sale"1 of U.S.A.
Medical stock at a time when they knew or should have known that
the stock was being manipulated.2

They misjudged the situation,

and the price of the stock continued to rise rapidly.

This meant

that the Johnsons would have to cover their short sale with much
more expensive stock. The entities to whom the Johnsons owed stock
then began the process of "buying-in"3 the stock that the Johnsons
owed to them. The Johnsons next went to the United States District
Court and sought a preliminary injunction from Judge Green to
prevent any buy-ins of stock to cover their short position.

The

preliminary injunction was denied because Judge Green, instead of
viewing the Johnsons as innocent victims of stock manipulation,
ruled

that

the

Johnsons

knew

or

should

have

known

of

the

X

A "short sale" occurs when a person sells stock, to be
delivered at a particular future date, that the person does not
currently own. The person must then buy an equivalent amount of
stock before the delivery date. If the price of the stock drops
during the interim between the sale date and the delivery date,
then the person makes money, while an increase in the stock price
before the delivery date causes the person to lose money. If the
person fails to deliver the stock on time, then the party who
originally purchased the short sale stock is allowed to "buy-in"
enough stock from some third party to cover the amount of stock
owed, and the cost of the buy-in stock is then charged to the
person who made the short sale.
2

When stock is being manipulated, its price will tend to rise,
often as a result of phony press hype and artificial trades between
nominee owners of the stock who are really controlled by the
manipulators.
Once the price is deemed high enough, the
manipulators sell their stock to the public, after which the price
usually nosedives rapidly.
If an individual
suspected
manipulation, and believed that the price had reached its peak,
that individual could sell short in the hopes of making a large
profit by purchasing the stock to cover the short sale after its
price had plummeted.
3

See, footnote 1,

supra.
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manipulation at the time they engaged in the short sale.
In part in response to the evidence introduced at the hearing
before Judge Green, the Division placed a Stop Trading Order on the
stock of U.S.A. Medical, Inc.

The Johnsons then purchased U.S.A.

Medical stock that they knew could not legally be sold due to the
Stop Trading Order.

They purchased the stock for over $506,000

less than they believed the stock would have cost before the Stop
Trading Order made sales of the stock illegal.

Because the

Johnsons' acts of knowingly helping others to violate the Stop
Trading Order constituted dishonest and unethical practices in the
securities business, the Division undertook a formal administrative
proceeding and sanctioned the Johnsons by suspending their licenses
for one year and placing them on two years probation.

ARGUMENT
At its Heart, the Johnsons' Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is Nothing More than an Attempt to Reargue the
Facts of the Case:
There are basically two views as to the facts in this case.
One view is the view summarized in the preceding section of this
brief*

That view has been adopted by every person and body who has

reviewed this matter (except, of course, for the Johnsons and their
counsel).

Based on this view of the evidence, the Court of

Appeals' Amended Opinion is eminently rational.
The other view is the view argued for by the Johnsons in their
petition.

Under this view, the Johnsons are merely innocent
- 3 -

victims to a fraud, who after uncovering the fraud were further
victimized by the Division when the Johnsons attempted to honor
their

contracts by purchasing

stock.

Most

importantly,

the

Johnsons, under this theory, were placed in an irreconcilable
conflict between the Divisions' Stop Trading Order and the NASD's
requirement that the Johnsons honor their contracts.
Every argument raised by the Johnsons in their petition
hinges, either directly or indirectly, on the Utah Supreme Court
reviewing the facts and accepting the Johnsons' view over the view
of Judge Green, the Division, and the Court of Appeals.

Such a

fact finding exercise is not an appropriate basis for an appeal by
writ of certiorari. That is particularly the case here, where the
Johnsons'

central

tenant,

that

they

were

placed

in

an

irreconcilable conflict between the Division and NASD, is simply
not true.
The Johnsons were never Required to Choose Between
Violating NASD Rules or Assisting in the Violation of the
Division's Stop Trading Order:
As recognized by the Division in its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, pages 8-9,
operative effect of the

,f

[t]he proper scope and

[Stop Trading] Order entered by the

Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities within this state."

Thus, the Division's Stop Trading

Order prevented the Johnsons from engaging in transactions in
U.S.A. Medical stock in Utah. At the very least, the Stop Trading
Order prevented any Utah resident from selling U.S.A. Medical stock
to the Johnsons, and the Johnsons' participation in such a sale
- 4 -

would be unethical even if it were not illegal.
NASD rules require that a member honor all trades, including
short

sales.

But, as the Johnsons readily admit, the NASD

recognizes buy-ins as a legitimate way to settle accounts when a
broker who sold short cannot make timely delivery of the stock
See,

owed.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, footnote 1.

It would therefore have been perfectly legal and proper for
the Johnsons, who were prohibited from purchasing stock in Utah to
cover their short positions, to have allowed buy-ins by the parties
to whom they owed the stock.

The Johnsons would then have owed

those parties for the price of the buy-ins.

(Of course, if the

Johnsons felt that they were victims of manipulation, they could
then sue those who were manipulating the stock for the losses
incurred by the Johnsons.) The only problem with that scenario is
that the Johnsons assert that they could not have afforded the
price of the buy-ins.

Even assuming that the Johnsons would have

been driven out of business by having to pay for the buy-ins, that
error in business judgment4 does not constitute a conflict between
4

At its core, the Johnsons' decision to buy so much of the
highly volatile U.S.A. Medical penny stock was a bad business
decision. Before becoming a market maker in the stock, JohnsonBowles was required to do extensive due diligence into the stock's
background. As a result, the Johnsons either knew or should have
known that the stock was being manipulated, as Judge Green found.
If the Johnsons knew that the stock was being manipulated, then
they are of course culpable themselves. If they did not know of
the manipulation, then they were negligent in their due diligence
review. In either case, the Johnsons apparently bought far more
U.S.A. Medical stock than was prudent in light of Johnson-Bowies'
financial condition. U.S.A. Medical was a high technology start up
company that was actively developing (and beginning to market)
certain medical devices. Any number of events, such as receiving
a patent, receiving an offer of merger from a large medical
- 5 -

the Division saying, on the one hand, that you cannot trade in a
security that is the subject of manipulation and NASD saying, on
the other hand, that you must honor your short sale contract by
paying for necessary buy-ins of the stock.
This Case does not meet the Criteria for Supreme Court
Review by Writ of Certiorari:
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth
the considerations that govern Supreme Court review by writ of
certiorari.

Certiorari should only be granted -'for special and

important reasons."

Of the four examples given in Rule 46, three

are clearly not relevant: There is no need to reconcile a conflict
between two Court of Appeals decisions with respect to the same
issue of law, there is no conflict between the Court of Appeals
decision and a decision of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals decision does not so far depart from the usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's supervisory power.
Likewise, the Amended Opinion by the Court of Appeals, while
it will have some general usefulness in the area of securities law,
does not decide important new questions that require the Supreme
Court's review. Instead, the analytical portion of the decision is
largely an application of the somewhat unusual facts of this case
equipment manufacturer, or developing a new breakthrough product,
could have easily legitimately driven up the price of the stock
tenfold or more in a very short period of time. If the price of
the stock had shot up under those legitimate circumstances,
Johnson-Bowles apparently would have been unable to cover its short
positions and would have been forced out of business.
It was
foolhardy of the Johnsons to have put so much money into a short
sale of stock in such a company.
- 6 -

to fairly well established existing law, albeit law that has not
always been previously applied in a securities case. For example,
much of the Amended Opinion is given over to a case specific
analysis of basic principles of due process, the sufficiency of the
evidence, and the application of the law to the facts.

The only

parts of the Amended Opinion that really addresses a "new" issue
are the parts about federal preemption and the scope of the
commerce clause.

The Court of Appeals deals with those issues in

entirely predictable ways.
the

federal

legislation

regulation, which
regulation.

There is no federal preemption where
clearly

is consistent

expressly

allows

in purpose with

for

state

the federal

There is no commerce clause problem where a state

regulates the sale of securities within its borders.

There is no

need for the Supreme Court to review those nearly inevitable
conclusions.
What is really being sought here is not a review of some
shocking new legal theory, but rather a review of the facts of this
case and how those facts ought to apply to the law. In that sense,
the Johnsons seek nothing more than a second bite at the appellate
apple, which is not the purpose of a certiorari review.
If a Writ of Certiorari
Carefully Limited:

is Granted,

it

Should be

The Johnsons have had a tendency to raise every conceivable
issue, whether well founded or not, at every conceivable juncture
of this litigation. For example, they raises over thirty distinct
grounds for reversal in their Court of Appeals brief, which ran
eighty-three pages, exclusive of addendum. Most of those arguments
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were simply deemed by the Court of Appeals to be without merits and
not worthy of analysis.

Likewise, the thirty-five page Petition

for Writ of Certiorari spends four pages simply listing a plethora
of possible issues for review on certiorari.

Needless to say, it

is practically impossible to adequately and fully respond to such
a shotgun-type appeal in a reasonable time or within reasonable
page limits.
The Division does feels that this case does not warrant a writ
of certiorari. If the Supreme Court, in its discretion, feels that
a writ of certiorari is appropriate, then the Division would
request that the Court take it upon itself to carefully define and
limit the issues to be reviewed.

Given the procedural history of

this case, appropriate guidance from the Court in limiting the
scope to the review to the issues that concern the Court will
result in a much better focuses set of briefs and oral arguments.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should deny the Johnsons' Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.

The Petition is primarily a diatribe against

factfinding with which the Johnsons disagree.

The key premise of

the Petition, that the Johnsons were placed in an irreconcilable
conflict between their duties to the Division and to NASD, is
simply not true.

If the Court decides that it wishes to review

this case, it should limit the writ to the specific question or
questions that concern the Court.
- 8 -

Under no circumstances should

the writ be granted carte

blanc on the multitude of possible issues

suggested in the Johnsons' Petition.

Respectfully

submitted

this

20th day of April,

1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID N. SONNENREICH
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of April, 1992, I
caused to be [] hand delivered y[ mailed, postage prepaid, four
true and correct copies of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to:
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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